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<R-AB>Abstract: The Integrative Memory model formalizes a new conceptualisation of 
memory in which interactions between representations and cognitive operations within large-
scale cerebral networks generate subjective memory feelings. Such interactions allow to 
explain the complexity of memory expressions, such as the existence of multiples sources for 
familiarity and recollection feelings and the fact that expectations determine how one 
recognises previously encountered information. 
 
<R-Text begins> 
The Integrative Memory model takes into account the complexity of memory, from the 
representations of elements of past experiences to the subjective feelings accompanying 
memory retrieval. As suggested by commentators Curot & Barbeau, the model could have 
been called the Interaction Memory model, as interactions between representations and 
cognitive operations within large-scale cerebral networks are at the core of the proposal. The 
majority of the commentaries follow the path of this integration/interaction scheme. We are 
grateful to all commentators for the insightful comments and the abundance of new ideas to 
be tested. In this response, we will address the issues raised in the commentaries by relating 
them to the key aspects of our Integrative Memory model: the representation core systems 
(section R1), the attribution system (section R2) and the subjective experiences of memory 
(section R3).  
 
<A>R1. Representation core systems 
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The idea that the content of past experiences are encoded in core systems which specialize in 
specific kinds of representations shaped by dedicated computational operations and the level 
of associativity that characterize constituent brain regions has been approved explicitly 
(Axmacher; Brady & Utochkin; Gainotti; Patchitt & Shergill; Sadeh) or tacitly by the 
large majority of the commentators. There is some controversy, however, concerning (1) the 
role of specific regions, (2) the specific nature of the computational operations distinguishing 
the various core systems, and (3) the consideration of additional types of information, such as 
emotion. In the sections below, we group the commentators’ arguments by focusing in turn on 
the postulated core systems – the entity, the context, and the relational representation core 
systems – before considering interactions with the Self and emotion. 
 
<B>R1.1. The entity representation core system 
In the target article, we propose that encountered entities pertaining to experienced events are 
encoded hierarchically in terms of the complexity of the representation: from individual 
features (e.g., shape, texture, color) in ventral occipitotemporal areas and conceptual features 
in anterior temporal areas, to unique conjunctive representations allowing the resolution of 
ambiguity in the face of objects with overlapping features and the identification of objects in a 
viewpoint-invariant manner.  
 
Gainotti points to the lateralization of the representations, with faces and voices 
prominently stored in right temporal areas and names lateralized to the left temporal areas. 
There is indeed a degree of hemispheric specialization in the medial and lateral temporal 
lobes. This is notably seen in material-specific double dissociation between recall and 
recognition memory in patients with selective unilateral hippocampal versus perirhinal lesions 
(Barbeau et al. 2011). In semantic dementia, some material-specific effects are also described, 
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with better recognition memory for objects than for words (Graham et al. 2002; Simons et al. 
2002). However, in this case, the reason for material-specific dissociation is to be found in the 
pathology affecting the anterior temporal lobe (Strikwerda-Brown & Irish). We agree with 
Strikwerda-Brown & Irish, as well as with Ionita, Talmi, & Taylor (Ionita et al.), that the 
inherent features of the stimuli will determine the kind of information supporting memory 
decisions, and notably feelings of familiarity. Words will rely much more on conceptual 
features than will object pictures, and consequently words are particularly vulnerable to the 
anterior temporal pathology in semantic dementia. Critically, however, the interaction 
between the anterior temporal lobe and the perirhinal cortex is important for the 
discrimination of objects that can be confused because of high perceptual and/or conceptual 
feature overlap. Amnesic patients with damage to the perirhinal cortex, but intact anterior 
temporal lobes, are impaired at discriminating between objects with a high, not low, degree of 
perceptual feature ambiguity, but their difficulty is attenuated when objects are meaningful 
(Barense et al. 2010). In semantic dementia, when both anterior temporal and perirhinal 
regions are affected, the deficit in discrimination between confusable objects is exacerbated 
for conceptually meaningful stimuli (Barense et al. 2010). Finally, discrimination between 
semantically confusable objects is more impaired in patients who suffer from combined 
anterior temporal/perirhinal damage than in patients whose damage is limited to the anterior 
temporal lobe (Wright et al. 2015).  
 
By shedding light on the role of the anterior temporal lobe, Strikwerda-Brown & 
Irish join Axmacher in calling for more consideration of representations in neocortical areas. 
We acknowledge that we placed much emphasis on the anterolateral entorhinal/perirhinal 
region and its proposed role in representing entities. Because of the historically central role of 
the medial temporal lobe (MTL), we wanted to make the point that the perirhinal cortex is not 
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supporting familiarity per se, but rather a particular kind of representations (i.e., entities). 
Nevertheless, implicit in the inclusion of neocortical areas within representation core systems, 
and in the claim of representations being shaped by unique computational operations, is the 
idea that the formats of representations are determined by the properties of underlying 
neocortical (and MTL) regions (as suggested by Axmacher). Furthermore, Axmacher argues 
that these representational properties may be determinant features of the subjective experience 
of memory rather than attribution mechanisms, a point to which we return in section R3. 
 
Additionally, the fact that our model includes interactions between hierarchically 
organised representation regions is emphasized by Curot & Barbeau, who point out a related 
prediction: activation of these regions should follow a precise order. This opens a whole 
avenue for research using various techniques that allow an evaluation of temporal dynamics 
in neural activity. Some preliminary EEG data centered on the time course of identification of 
objects via a 1-back task (in which one tells whether an object is the same as the one seen just 
before) at various levels of the hierarchy within the entity core representation system indicate 
that access to an entity representation comes later than access to a conceptual representation, 
which itself arises later than access to a low-level perceptual representation (Besson et al., 
unpublished data). More work remains to be done, however, notably by using methods that 
enable us to examine the temporal dynamics of precisely localized regions, such as 
intracranial EEG (Curot & Barbeau). 
 
Our hypothesis of entity-level representations in the anterolateral entorhinal/perirhinal 
cortex is somewhat challenged by Brady & Utochkin who argue that entities also require 
relational coding and binding (see also Hakobyan & Cheng; Sreekumar, Yim, Zaghloul, & 
Dennis [Sreekumar et al.], for related suggestions). Indeed, numerous studies - from 
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working memory to long-term memory, on arbitrary to semantically meaningful objects – do 
not support the idea of a pure perceptually unitized representation of objects (Brady et al. 
2013; Chalfonte & Johnson 1996; Fougnie & Alvarez 2011); and we acknowledge that this 
was overlooked when we wrote that “at the level of the perirhinal cortex and anterolateral 
entorhinal… all visual features are integrated in a single complex representation of the object” 
(target article, sect. 4.1., para. 3). Behind this sentence and our definition of the entity 
representation lies the idea that at this level, entities could be distinguished as a whole rather 
than as a sum of overlapping features represented in order to distinguish objects at their 
individual level. Cognitive data showing separate coding of the exemplar and the object state 
also directly suggest that exemplar recognition operates despite object state or pose (Brady et 
al. 2013; Utochkin & Brady 2018). Our view is that the entity-level representations in the 
anterolateral entorhinal/perirhinal cortex correspond to the higher level of representation of 
the object, both anatomically and functionally, and as such represent the individual object in a 
way abstracted from its presentation characteristics (viewpoint, perceptual conditions of 
presentation, functional state or pose, etc.). In that sense, the features integrated at this level in 
a single complex representation of the object are those that the system considers to be 
characterizing and defining the object as a unique member of its category. Such defining 
features may be contextual in nature (e.g. the classic coffee mug of a specific brand used by a 
colleague at the lab might be encoded as a distinct entity, as the exact same one that I use at 
home). They must be distinguished from any other feature that the system considers as 
associated with but not defining the object. In order to retrieve any of this second class of 
features that were related to the object, the flexible and relational representation offered by the 
hippocampus might be critical. 
 
<B>R1.2. The context representation core system 
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In the target article we proposed that the contextual setting for an event is represented first by 
elements of the environment (e.g., sounds, visual details, space perception…) stored in 
posterior occipitoparietal sites and that these elements become more integrated as scenes and 
spatial configurations in the parahippocampal cortex. Moreover, the posteromedial entorhinal 
cortex would encode an internally generated grid of the spatial environment. If some of these 
elements become the focus of attention in a memory task (e.g., a building), they can be 
recognized and can, for example, generate a feeling of familiarity. Alternatively, they will 
provide the context within which an event occurs or a specific item is encountered, so that the 
context representation is bound together with other information into the relational 
representation core system. 
 
Several commentators reproached us for not elaborating on this core system 
sufficiently; but they did not question its relevance (Axmacher; Hakobyan & Cheng; Riva, 
Di Lernia, Serino, & Serino [Riva et al.]). The commentators are right in underlining that 
more can be said about this system and they highlight some dimensions that could help 
characterize the respective content and representation formats of the context representation 
core system (Axmacher). In particular, the case of scenes is a puzzling issue. In our model, we 
suggested that scenes are represented in the parahippocampal cortex, given evidence of a 
specific response of this region to scene familiarity (Kafkas et al. 2017; Preston et al. 2010). 
In contrast, Hakobyan & Cheng regard scenes as part of the “what” information that is 
supported by the ventral visual stream culminating in the perirhinal cortex. Yet, other views 
are conveyed by Zeidman and Maguire (2016) who suggest that the hippocampus is involved 
in the construction of spatially coherent scene representations, and by Howett et al. (2019) 
who relate impaired virtual reality navigation within scenes to atrophy of the posteromedial 
entorhinal cortex in prodromal Alzheimer’s disease (AD). There is clearly a need for further 
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research on this topic. It may be that there are qualitatively different kinds of scenes, 
depending on the nature of constituent elements (e.g., buildings, landscape, spatial 
configuration, etc.). It could also be that the role of the scene in a given event, as focus of 
attention versus as background context, would determine how it is represented. 
 
Another dimension that we overlooked in our model is the egocentric/allocentric 
distinction (Axmacher; Riva et al.). This distinction is particularly interesting when framing 
the role of the retrosplenial cortex. We placed this region within the context representation 
core system because it should enable cortical reinstatement of the content of memories as a 
gateway between the hippocampus and regions storing the sensory-perceptual details of the 
memory (Aggleton 2010). A more detailed description of its role in both encoding and 
retrieval of events could indeed be the transformation of egocentric representations (mediated 
by posterior parietal areas) into allocentric representations (mediated by the hippocampus and 
entorhinal cortex), and vice versa (Aggleton 2010; Serino et al. 2015; Vann et al. 2009). 
Several studies have shown deficient translation between egocentric and allocentric frames of 
reference in Alzheimer’s disease (Serino et al. 2015), especially in early-onset cases (Pai & 
Yang 2013) and in the stage of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI; Ruggiero et al. 2018) 
where the retrosplenial cortex shows prominent damage (Boccia et al. 2016). Following on 
this, one could predict that the early hypometabolism and atrophy of the retrosplenial cortex 
in Braak Stage 3 would disturb the recollection of details from past events because of such 
translation difficulty. Relatedly, the observation of decreased “field” recall of personal past 
events (i.e., event visualised through one’s own eyes, in the first-person perspective) and 
increased “observer” recall (i.e., event seen as a spectator from a third-person perspective) in 
Alzheimer’s disease may possibly also be associated with retrosplenial-related impaired 
egocentric-allocentric synchronisation (El Haj et al. 2019; Kapogiannis & El Haj). However, 
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distinct roles for the parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices have been reported in spatial 
navigation (Auger et al. 2012), and reconciliation between spatial and non-spatial roles of the 
retrosplenial cortex was recently identified as a scientific challenge (Mitchell et al. 2018). 
 
<B>R1.3. The relational representation core system 
Our view of the organization of the relational representation core system matches traditional 
influential models of the role of the hippocampus and the extended hippocampal system, by 
proposing that it rapidly encodes a detailed representation of the item bound to associated 
contextual information, or more generally complex high-resolution bindings, via relational 
pattern separation (Aggleton & Brown 1999; Aggleton, Dumont & Warburton 2011; 
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas & Ranganath 2007; Montaldi & Mayes 2010; Ranganath & Ritchey 
2012; Yonelinas 2013). We do not make any novel proposal regarding this core system and so 
we did not feel it necessary in the target article to describe data showing that damage to each 
part of the system (i.e., hippocampus, fornix, mammillary bodies, and anterior thalamus 
nuclei) leads to memory disorders, especially affecting recollection. This omission is regretted 
by Aggleton. Although this was beyond the scope of our proposal, we agree that further 
research needs to assess whether the mammillary body–anterior thalamic axis contributes a 
specific function beyond that supported by the hippocampus in the encoding and retrieval of 
complex events. In addition to examining the specific memory (and non-memory) profile of 
patients with diencephalic lesions, ultra-high resolution MRI and functional connectivity 
analyses as well as examination of coupling of neural oscillations may provide some insight 
about the interplay between the medial diencephalon and other regions (notably, the 
hippocampus, retrosplenial cortex, and prefrontal cortex). Indeed, the specific role of each 
component of the relational representation core system may depend on in its specific afferent-
efferent profile and, therefore, in the kind of information it processes and how it is brought 
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into the system or transferred for further processing by other regions (Aggleton 2012; Ketz et 
al. 2015; Vann 2010). 
 
<B>R1.4. Self and emotion 
A few commentators deplored that we did not take into account the emotional flavour of 
memories that can be provided through the amygdala (Axmacher; Nephew, Chumachenko, 
& Forester [Nephew et al.]; Staniloiu & Markowitsch; Strikwerda-Brown & Irish). As 
we stated in the conclusion of the target article, our proposed model is certainly not 
comprehensive and should evolve to incorporate more brain regions (notably the amygdala 
and basal forebrain) and more mechanisms. In terms of the psycho-affective flavour of 
memories, we mainly described how interactions with a self-referential system give self-
relatedness and personal meaningfulness to stored representations. Indeed, personal memories 
are strongly interconnected with the Self (Conway 2005) and these interactions contribute to 
the subjective feeling of reliving past events (Tulving 2002). In contrast, as most of the 
evidence that we reviewed relied on memory for neutral events, we did not elaborate on the 
role of emotion in shaping representations and subjective memory experiences. However, 
Staniloiu & Markowitsch are right to point out that this dimension is needed to understand the 
nature of memory deficits in patients with lesions to the amygdala and in psychiatric cases, 
such as dissociative amnesia (Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011; Staniloiu & Markowitsch 
2014). 
 
The role of the amygdala appears to be the modulation of cognitive functions with 
emotional cues so as to incorporate the biological and social significance of events and 
actions. In the case of episodic autobiographical memories, the amygdala will tag them with 
their specific emotional significance and facilitate their retrieval (Markowitsch & Staniloiu 
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2011). According to the emotional binding account, when an event involves an emotional 
response, the amygdala binds this emotional response to representations of items in the 
perirhinal cortex (Ritchey et al. 2019; Yonelinas & Ritchey 2015). Another dimension that 
modulates memories is stress and anxiety (Nephew et al.). For example, acute stress could act 
as a memory filter at encoding, favouring events that elicited a strong neural activity in the 
medial temporal lobe (Ritchey et al. 2017). Nephew et al.  further emit the interesting idea 
that anxiety may affect task context and metacognition, which would modify recollection and 
familiarity outputs by changing expectations and attentional focus. An intriguing example that 
could support this idea is psychogenic déjà-vu, where an individual with a high level of 
anxiety reported a form of persistent déjà-vu without any neurological explanation (Wells et 
al. 2014).  
 
Patchitt & Shergill interpret two psychiatric syndromes, the Capgras delusion and the 
Fregoli syndrome, in light of the Integrative Memory model. We have reported the case of a 
patient with probable Alzheimer’s disease who presented symptoms of Capgras syndrome 
with regard to her husband (Jedidi et al. 2015). Compared to other probable Alzheimer’s 
disease patients without any misidentification symptoms, the patient showed decreased 
metabolism in the posterior cingulate gyrus/precuneus and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. 
We interpreted the Capgras syndrome in this patient as related to impaired recognition of a 
familiar face and impaired reflection on personally relevant knowledge about a face. Other 
interpretations include a disconnection between regions supporting face representations and 
regions encoding the emotional significance of the face (Breen et al. 2000). Investigating the 
role of a disruption of the attribution system due to frontal dysfunction, as suggested by 
Patchitt & Shergill, is certainly worthwhile, but we believe that this is an example of a 
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disorder for which the role of emotion must be taken into account (see Staniloiu & 
Markowitsch). 
 
<A>R2. The attribution system 
 
One of the most critical claims of the Integrative Memory model is that the attribution system 
modulates the use of memory traces reactivated in representation core systems as a function 
of expectations, task context, and goals, thus modulating subjective experiences and explicit 
judgments. In other words, we incorporated mechanisms from attribution theories (Bodner & 
Lindsay 2003; McCabe & Balota 2007; Voss et al. 2012; Westerman et al. 2002; Whittlesea 
2002) into more traditional recollection/familiarity views. This proposal, approved by many 
commentators (Bodner & Bernstein; Curot & Barbeau; Hakobyan & Cheng; Kelley & 
Jacoby; Patchitt & Shergill; Sadeh; Tibon; Wang; Yang & Köhler), raises new questions 
for future work (Curot & Barbeau; Hakobyan & Cheng; Kelley & Jacoby; Strikwerda-
Brown & Irish; Tibon; Wang; Yang & Köhler), but also generates controversy (Aggleton; 
Axmacher; Ionita et al.). These commentaries refer mainly to fluency cues, attribution 
mechanisms, and false memories. 
 
<B>R2.1. Fluency cues 
In the target article, we argue that fluency cues are important signals for familiarity when 
recognising studied items. More precisely, when a previously encountered item is repeated in 
a memory task, processing of the item and its constituent components (perceptual and 
conceptual features and their unique configuration as entity) is facilitated. This easier and 
more rapid processing (i.e., fluency), when in contrast with the expected baseline fluency of 
processing, produces a vague experience of ease (Masson & Caldwell 1998; Oppenheimer 
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2008; Reber et al. 2004; Whittlesea & Williams 2000) which is attributed to past occurrence 
and generates a feeling of familiarity. The translation from the repetition-related facilitated 
processing into a feeling of familiarity thus requires the attribution system (see section R2.2). 
Familiarity for fluent items is not obligatory, as the attribution system may lead to 
disqualification of fluency cues. 
 
While Aggleton thinks that too much importance is given to fluency in the generation 
of feelings of familiarity, other commentators support our point of view and even reinforce it 
with additional suggestions (Ionita et al.; Sadeh; Wang; Yang & Köhler). It is likely that 
part of the controversy is due to a blurry definition of fluency in our target article. In our 
view, perceptual fluency as a “change in threshold for information that has been previously 
experienced” (Aggleton) may correspond to the full fluency heuristic, given that the setting of 
the decision threshold falls within the duty of the attribution system. Like Sadeh, and Yang & 
Köhler, we define repetition-related fluency, at the behavioral level, as facilitated 
perceptual/conceptual/entity-level processing of repeated stimuli; and, at the neural level, as 
reduced activity of neurons where these features were first processed (Bogacz et al. 2001; 
Reber 2013; Suzuki & Naya 2014). While Ionita et al. refer to repetition-related fluency as  a 
“non-mnemonic” signal, we would argue that it is mnemonic when it concerns a stimulus that 
has been encountered at least once before (even if we are not aware of that). As underlined by 
Yang & Köhler, reduced neuronal activity for repeated stimuli (or repetition suppression) has 
been interpreted as sharpening (Norman 2010).Yang & Köhler further suggest that sharpening 
may be a neural phenomenon common to both fluency and global matching (which indexes 
the degree of feature overlap between a cue and stored representations). Finally, Sadeh 
proposes that fluency is a key player in the attribution of familiarity even when information is 
retrieved from the relational representation core system. This author points to different 
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findings to support this hypothesis, such as fluency effects for relational information in the 
form of facilitated judgments in a variety of tasks, as well as repetition suppression in the 
hippocampus for repeated associations. Another argument can be found in a study by Gomes 
et al. (2016), which showed a hippocampal deactivation linked to fluency-based supraliminal 
associative priming (size judgments for pairs of objects). However, one needs to determine 
whether relational fluency is interpreted as a feeling of familiarity or an experience of 
recollection in explicit memory tasks. 
 
As reminded by Wang, repetition-related fluency is a mechanism shared by explicit 
forms of memory (e.g., familiarity) and implicit forms of memory (e.g., priming). On this 
basis, Wang suggests that implicit measures may best capture the status of representations in 
the core systems, contrary to explicit judgments in memory tasks that are biased by attribution 
mechanisms. We think that, more than the implicit or explicit character of the task, it is 
important to consider its objective demand (Whittlesea & Price 2001). The performance-
oriented priming tests with objective measures, such as word-stem completion or picture 
naming, are probably the best to capture the status of representations, compared to more 
subjective implicit memory tasks that rely also on attributional processes, such as mere 
exposure effect or fame effect paradigms, or other illusion-oriented implicit memory 
measures (Buchner & Brandt 2003). In addition, some studies shed light on the role of 
fluency attribution even in performance-oriented priming tests, such as the possible-
impossible decision task. Indeed, in this task, fluency seems to lead subjects to respond 
‘‘possible” to both possible and impossible objects that have been previously studied 




Nevertheless, beyond repetition-related fluency, there are other sources of fluency that 
we would regard as non-mnemonic fluency, but which can also lead to a feeling of familiarity 
(Ionita et al.). The existence of these non-mnemonic sources of fluency could help to explain 
partially the finding, pointed by Aggleton, that some patients with amnesia are not able to use 
fluency as a cue for recognition memory, despite successfully completing priming tasks (Levy 
et al. 2004), a fact that has led several authors to conclude that fluency has no or only small 
influence on people’s memory decisions (Conroy et al. 2005; Squire & Dede 2015). Recently, 
however, studies have shown that changes in how amnesic patients attribute fluency to the 
past could account for this pattern of results (Geurten et al. 2019; Geurten & Willems 2017; 
Ozubko & Yonelinas 2014). For instance, Geurten et al. (2017; 2019) examined the influence 
of the introduction of an alternative (non-mnemonic) source of fluency on amnesic patients’ 
recognition decisions by manipulating the perceptual quality of stimuli during a forced-choice 
recognition test. They found that patients disregard fluency when they detect an alternative 
source that can explain the easy processing of the stimulus, as do healthy subjects in the same 
paradigm (Willems & Van der Linden 2006). However, amnesic patients detect this 
alternative source more readily than healthy participants and thus disqualify more often 
fluency as a cue for memory. Patients’ underuse of fluency could result from a learned re-
interpretation of fluency as a poor cue for memory rather than from a real inability to rely on 
it. Because of the high number of situations where fluency leads to memory errors in patients’ 
daily lives, the ecological validity of the correlation between fluency and past occurrence 
gradually decreases. In order to reduce fluency-based memory errors, patients would 
progressively learn to implement strategies to track biasing fluency sources. Behaviorally, this 
leads them to rely on fluency only when they can attribute it to their memory with a high level 




An alternative and complementary explanation to the priming-without-recognition 
pattern in amnesia can be found in the retrieval mode, attention orientation, and processing 
style adopted by participants in some contexts. This idea is compatible with Kelley & 
Jacoby’s pre-access control hypothesis. More precisely, qualitatively different processing 
strategies – analytic versus non-analytic – have been shown to ensure or prevent the fluency 
experience (Whittlesea & Price 2001; Willems et al. 2010; Willems et al. 2008; Willems & 
Van der Linden 2009). An analytic form of processing consists in isolating some component 
parts of a stimulus – for example, to determine whether any of them acts as a cue for recalling 
diagnostic details. This style of processing can be preferred when a given recognition memory 
task appears as a considerable challenge. On the other hand, a non-analytic mode corresponds 
to examining the stimulus as a whole. Healthy participants and patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease sometimes believe that their only hope of discriminating new from old stimuli is by 
discovering some specific details that they could recognise (Willems et al. 2008). However, 
Whittlesea and Price (2001) demonstrated that, even when a stimulus is presented in the same 
form as it was encountered earlier, if the participants analyse the stimulus into parts at testing, 
they will not experience enhanced processing fluency.  
 
Within the Integrative Memory model, such a pattern of results can be explained by 
the interaction between metacognitive knowledge and components that create the retrieval 
mode during memory search (top-down attention and cue specification/memory search 
supported by dorsal parietal and ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). This allows 
individuals’ expectations and beliefs to constrain the type of information that will be favoured 
during memory retrieval, as illustrated above. But also, as emphasized by Kelley & Jacoby, 
this can guide inferential mechanisms in order to avoid misattributions, such as false 
memories. For instance, Kelley & Jacoby describe a capture effect by which older adults, 
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patients with Alzheimer’s disease, and patients with traumatic brain injury are more prone to 
falsely remember misleading primes than young and healthy individuals (Dockree et al. 2006; 
Jacoby et al. 2005; Millar et al. 2018). 
 
<B>R2.2. Attribution mechanisms 
We claim that the attribution system is a key player in the generation of subjective 
experiences of memory and explicit judgments in memory tasks by modulating the use of 
reactivated content in core systems through the lens of metacognitive, monitoring, and 
attention mechanisms. This seems a contentious proposal as some commentators believe that 
such attribution mechanisms may not always be necessary (Axmacher; Ionita et al.), while 
others abound in our direction and evoke mechanisms that could contribute to the functioning 
of such a system (Hakobyan & Cheng; Kelley & Jacoby; Tibon; Wang; Yang & Köhler). 
We readily acknowledge that the description of the attribution system and of the role of the 
parietal regions in our target article was poorly elaborated. Our aim was first to put forward 
its role in shaping subjective and explicit outputs. But there is clearly a need to unpack its 
underlying mechanisms and associated neural correlates. We are delighted to see that, when 
admitted, many ideas for refining our understanding of the functioning of this attribution 
system arise (Hakobyan & Cheng; Kelley & Jacoby; Tibon; Yang & Köhler).  
 
 
First of all, it may be that the term “attribution” is fuzzy and misleading and does not 
fully capture the complexity of inferential mechanisms that lead to subjective feelings and 
explicit judgments. For instance, Ionita et al.  posit that recollection does not need attribution 
mechanisms because the details from past experiences that are reactivated in the relational 
representation core system are mnemonic in nature and diagnostic of past encounters and, 
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therefore, do not require interpretation by an attribution system, in contrast to familiarity 
which may arise from non-mnemonic fluency cues (e.g., perceptual clarity). So, Ionita et al.  
suggest that attribution comes into play only when there are several possible signals, either 
mnemonic or non-mnemonic, that could be interpreted as evidence of prior exposure and, 
thus, when there is a possibility of misattribution (e.g., interpreting a non-mnemonic signal as 
due to memory). Actually, our meaning behind “attribution” was more in line with Whittlesea 
and Williams’ (2000) view and refers to subconscious inferential processes that allow one to 
make sense of the quality of different data and processing (and not only as source attribution 
processes), and that can be applied to any kind of memory experiences (i.e., recollection and 
familiarity) and also to non-memory judgments (e.g., aesthetic judgments, preference 
judgments). 
  
According to this definition, inferential “attribution” processes are necessary to 
explain the fact that some non-mnemonic processes, such as metacognitive expectations, may 
influence recollection-based memory decisions. For example, Simmons-Stern et al. (2012) 
have found that people held the (wrong) metacognitive belief that they would recollect more 
information after encoding some materials via a song than after a spoken encoding, leading 
them to adopt a more conservative response criterion regarding the amount of information 
they feel they should be able to recollect after studying sung materials. This results in a 
reduction of both correct and false recognitions on a subsequent memory test. Such a pattern 
is difficult to explain without the intervention of some metacognitive processes that, in the 
Integrative Memory model, are included in the attribution system. Another kind of evidence 
comes from studies that found a fluency effect on recollection responses. Ionita et al.  point 
out that one hallmark of the attribution processes is the presence of fluency-based false alarms 
that signal the occurrence of misattribution. This pattern was noted by Kurilla and Westerman 
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(2008) in experiments showing that perceptual and conceptual priming at test increased 
claims of recollection and familiarity (via Remember/Know responses), with a larger effect 
for lures than for targets. 
 
However, we agree that some of the control/monitoring processes involved in 
familiarity and recollection decisions are probably more of a pre-retrieval than of a post-
retrieval nature (Kelley & Jacoby; see also section R2.1). Restricting what comes to mind, 
depending on task context and people’s goals, is probably an important step to avoid memory 
misattribution. The context or the task demand could influence metacognitive expectations 
and the retrieval mode adopted by the participants, favouring fluency (Whittlesea & Price 
2001; Willems et al. 2008) or the search for some specific types of details (Bodner & Lindsay 
2003; Bodner & Richardson-Champion 2007). The interaction between the pre- and post-
access monitoring processes is thus expected to influence the quality of the evaluation, 
producing a feeling of coherence or discrepancy responsible for the emergence of familiarity 
and recollection. 
 
The role of parietal regions in memory is clearly a larger subject that requires more in-
depth discussion than the concise treatment we gave in the target article. Indeed, we mainly 
linked ventral parietal activity to bottom-up attention following the Attention-To-Memory 
model (Cabeza, Ciaramelli & Moscovitch 2012). According to this model, the presentation of 
a cue or an output captures the focus of attention in both memory and perception tasks. Tibon 
argues that ventral parietal activity should not only be attributed to attention processes, but 
also to the representational quality and the subjective evaluation of the memory trace, 
justifying its position at the intersection of the core and attribution systems. Previous fMRI 
studies found increased brain activity in the ventral parietal cortex during episodic memory 
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retrieval, but whether this pattern of activity resulted from the engagement of attention or 
memory processes was unclear (Rugg & King 2018). Interestingly, Kuhl and Chun (2014) 
showed that the angular gyrus was not only sensitive to whether an item was correctly 
remembered but it also represented what the item was, which suggests that the parietal cortex 
may hold some item representations, in line with the idea that representational features are not 
only stored in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) (Axmacher; Tibon). Nevertheless, the role of 
parietal regions seems to go beyond mere representation. Many fMRI studies found activity in 
the ventral parietal cortex when participants assigned Remember judgements (Wang et al. 
2016), vividness ratings (Richter et al. 2016; Tibon et al. 2019) or confidence judgements 
(Qin et al. 2011). These findings are congruent with the view that the parietal cortex, and 
more precisely the angular gyrus, contributes to our subjective experience of remembering 
(Yazar et al. 2012). More direct support for this assumption comes from neuropsychological 
data showing reduced confidence ratings but spared “objective” source memory performance 
in patients with parietal lesions (Simons et al. 2010). 
 
As noted by Yang & Köhler, it is most likely that different parietal regions support 
different functions. To give only one illustration, the angular gyrus was found to track the 
strength of recollection, whereas the temporoparietal junction was more active during 
incorrect source memory than true recollection (Hutchinson et al. 2014). Rather than adopting 
a modular view, examination of gradients within the parietal areas (notably, in terms of 
connectivity) may help to resolve the complex nature of the interplay between parietal areas 
and key regions from the representation core systems and attribution system (Huntenburg et 
al. 2018). Therefore, within the parietal cortex, some parts may be more involved in attention-
to-memory mechanisms and others in the generation of subjective aspects of memory. Tibon 
proposes the interesting idea that some parietal areas may provide an index of the quality or 
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quantity of signals reactivated in core systems that will be used by the attribution system to 
make some inference and that will lead to subjective experience of remembering (see also 
Rugg & King 2018). Additionally, Yang & Köhler evoke the role of parietal regions in 
evidence accumulation. In this view, the parietal cortex would accumulate signals about a 
situation until a decision is made (Wagner et al. 2005). In the case of a memory task, this 
would imply integrating signals from the MTL and the posterior cingulate hub on which 
prefrontal-related decision processes can apply. How exactly parietal and prefrontal areas 
interact during the retrieval process is an unresolved issue that is central to the understanding 
of the attribution system (Strikwerda-Brown & Irish). 
 
In the search for an operationalization of the steps leading from representations to 
overt memory decisions, Yang & Köhler suggest that the Diffusion model (Ratcliff et al. 
2016) may provide a promising framework (see also Osth, Dunn, Heathcote, & Ratcliff 
[Osth et al.]). According to the Diffusion model, in a recognition memory task, decision 
about whether or not a stimulus has been previously encountered relies on the accumulation 
of evidence until a threshold is reached in favour of one of the choices (i.e., yes/no). 
Moreover, Hakobyan & Cheng draw a parallel between the attribution system and the 
retrieval process described in terms of attractor dynamics (Greve et al. 2010). However, this 
view is quite different from our own as Greve et al. (2010) propose that recollection and 
familiarity emerge from distinct retrieval processes applied to a single representation, whereas 
we argue that recollection and familiarity memory experiences usually rely on qualitatively 
different representations which undergo processing in a single (but complex) attribution 
system. Notwithstanding, we fully agree that more elaboration of this attribution system is 
needed and that existing models, such as the Diffusion model, could help to describe 




<B>R2.3. False memories 
A few commentators regret that we did not elaborate on how false memories are generated, in 
particular false recollections (Bodner & Bernstein; Hakobyan & Cheng; Ionita et al.). 
Notably, Bodner & Bernstein refer to several phenomena in which false recollections occur, 
such as the misinformation effect, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) effect, or rich false 
memories in which people believe that they remember entire events that actually never 
happened.  
 
In the Integrative Memory model, false recollections can be understood when 
considering that the subjective experiences of recollection and familiarity are generated 
through a unitary attribution system, so that a recollective experience could occur regardless 
of whether or not a test item was studied, provided that the test item acts as an effective 
retrieval cue for past events even if they do not concern the experimental context. This fits 
with the source misattribution account (McCabe & Geraci 2009), according to which false 
recollections are the result of a misattribution of the source of the information within the 
attribution system. In such cases, unstudied test items cue the actual (true) recollection of 
extra-list contextual information that are erroneously attributed to the study context. For 
example, a participant may experience a feeling of remembering when an object picture 
reactivates a past encounter with this object outside the experimental task, but if this exact 
source is not identified, this may induce him or her to endorse the object picture as recollected 
in a recognition memory task. The way such extra-list information would be cued within the 
core representational systems could be assimilated to the process of pattern completion (Yassa 




Ionita et al. suggest that certain types of materials may be more prone to 
misattribution (see also Strikwerda-Brown & Irish for suggestion of material-related 
differences). They point out that studies supporting the idea of an attribution system for 
recollection often use less distinctive stimuli (i.e., words) that are more commonly 
encountered outside the laboratory than objects or scenes, and that are often presented in 
visually impoverished encoding conditions. In such cases, recollection decisions would rely 
heavily on the reactivation of contextual elements from the encoding episode, which are likely 
to be internal rather than external. We agree that retrieval mechanisms differ as a function of 
the nature of the materials. However, this is not incompatible with the source misattribution 
account, if both internal and external contextual elements represent the source of the 
occurrence of a given stimulus, considering that our definition of “attribution” is not restricted 
to non-mnemonic signals (see sect. R2.2). This implies that the difference between true and 
false recollections is not so much in the quality or veracity of the representations within the 
representation core systems, but, rather, false recollections would differentiate themselves 
from true memories by the erroneous attribution of a given representation within the core 
systems to the wrong past episode. 
 
Also, Hakobyan & Cheng tackle the question of false recognition of lures with 
features that highly overlap with targets features, which we suggest are dependent upon the 
perirhinal and entorhinal cortices as pattern separators of individual entities. Precisely, 
Hakobyan & Cheng argue that some results from patients with selective hippocampal lesions 
challenge this idea, since these patients show increased false alarms towards similar lures with 
no increase towards unrelated lures. We  can only agree that the hippocampus might 
contribute somewhat to entity pattern discrimination. However, we also note that, in these 
studies, most patients actually do manage to perform the task well above chance (Bayley et al. 
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2008; Holdstock et al. 2002), suggesting that they do have some ability to discriminate highly 
similar lures. Therefore, the hippocampus could contribute, while not being necessary, to 
entity pattern separation. 
 
Bodner & Bernstein further suggest that the case of false memory could help in 
understanding how the neuro-architecture underlying recollection and familiarity develops 
and shifts across the lifespan. Notably, they wonder how our Integrative Memory model 
might handle the fact that the “likelihood of different memory errors shifts from childhood to 
adulthood,” with misinformation and rich false memories following a U-shaped development 
(Brainerd & Reyna 2005) and the DRM illusion following a linear trajectory. We postulate 
that the metacognitive component of the attribution system could help explain these patterns. 
Indeed, metacognitive abilities undertake dramatic changes throughout the course of 
childhood, changes that have been shown to impact children’s memory performance and, 
particularly, false memories. For instance, Geurten et al. (2018) have found age-related 
differences in how 4-, 6-, and 8-year-old children relied on their metacognitive expectations 
about the quality of their memory to guide memory decisions in a recognition memory test. 
Indeed, younger children have more difficulties than older children in determining how much 
information they should be able to recollect and in setting a well-adjusted decision threshold. 
Moreover, in a study examining familiarity-based memory illusions (Geurten et al. 2017), 8-
year-old children and adults relied more on fluency when it was greater than expected in a 
given context (i.e., for lures more than for targets). In contrast, 4- and 6-year-old children 
based their memory decision on the absolute level of fluency (i.e., the more fluent an item, the 
more likely to be called “studied”). These results are important because they suggest that 
changes in children’s metacognitive expectations about what is a fluent item in a specific 
25 
 
context could account for the developmental decrease observed in the frequency of false 
memories during childhood. 
 
<A>R3. How are subjective experiences of memory generated? 
 
In many memory situations, the explicit judgments and the subjective experience that the 
individuals report match the nature of the representations that are reactivated in representation 
core systems (e.g., the reactivation of item-study context associations during item-recognition 
memory would lead to a feeling of recollecting the encoding episode). However, sometimes, 
the qualitative and subjective experience in a given memory task may dissociate from the 
memory reconstructed by a core system. One example is the disqualification of fluency cues 
(see sect. R2.1). In the target article, we argue that the inclusion of an attribution system is 
necessary to explain the modulation of the translation of reactivated content into outputs. This 
idea is supported by many commentators (Curot & Barbeau; Hakobyan & Cheng; 
Kapogiannis & El Haj; Kihlstrom), who evoke the diversity of the explicit outputs and the 
subjective experiences that we can have and how they are modified in pathology. Axmacher 
nevertheless questions the extent to which the attribution system defines the subjective quality 
of memories. 
 
<B>R3.1. Do attribution mechanisms shape subjective experiences of memory? 
Axmacher argues that the representational formats of contents within the medial temporal 
lobe and the neocortex are sufficient to determine the subjective qualities of the explicit 
memory experience without the need for an attribution system. We strongly agree that the 
subjective quality of a memory is mainly shaped by its content or representational properties, 
and does not come from the attribution system itself. In many cases, inferential processes only 
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validate the adequacy of retrieved content to expectations for a given decision. In this view, 
the subjective memory experience of recollection or vivid recall (e.g., a Remember response 
or a vividness rating) is based on the reinstatement of the context and relational 
representations. For instance, using trial-by-trial analyses, we found that subjective vividness 
judgements are based on the properties of a remembered episode – the objective amount of 
retrieved details (Folville et al. 2019).  
 
Nevertheless, it can happen that participants report a memory decision (e.g., old/new) 
or a particular subjective experience that does not match the reactivated representation. For 
example, a crime scene detail of medium retrieval difficulty elicits a Remember judgment 
more often when mixed with difficult details than easy details (Bodner & Richardson-
Champion 2007). Another example is the observation that amnesic patients reject fluent old 
stimuli, instead of using the fluency signal as a cue for oldness as healthy people do (Geurten 
& Willems 2017; Geurten et al. 2019; Ozubko & Yonelinas 2014). Another illustration is the 
finding that healthy older people claim that their memory for a given scene or episode is very 
vivid despite the small amount of details they can recall about it (Hashtroudi et al. 1990; 
Robin & Moscovitch 2017). These examples and others suggest that the explicit memory 
report given by a participant is also modulated by metamemory, monitoring, and pre-access 
control mechanisms (section R2.2; see also Kelley & Jacoby). For instance, Folville et al. 
(2019) have shown that the amount of recalled details about a scene predicted the associated 
vividness ratings for memory of the scene in young and older adults, but this relationship was 
significantly smaller in older participants. An interpretation for this observation is that both 
young and older adults used the properties or the details of memories to shape their vividness 
feeling, but older adults monitored/weighted these details differently when calibrating their 




Axmacher raises a very good point by asking, “if feelings of familiarity or 
recollection do not match with the typical representational format of the corresponding 
memories, are these feelings really the same as in more usual cases?” At face value, the 
endorsement of categorical responses (Remember/Know; old/new; high versus low vividness) 
does not allow us to distinguish atypical from typical experiences. fMRI cortical 
reinstatement analyses would likely show that the representations behind the judgments are 
not the same; yet this does not tell us anything about the detailed phenomenology of the 
feelings. This may be a topic for future studies.   
 
<B>R3.2. The diversity of subjective memory experiences 
Kihlstrom underlines that other types of memory experiences than the classical remembering 
and feeling of familiarity could be considered as well, such as “recognition-by-knowing,” 
“recognition-by-feeling,” and “remembering-as-believing.” With the Remember/Know 
paradigm, Know responses are assigned to memory experiences devoid of the retrieval of 
contextual encoding details. Therefore, a Know response could be assigned to a face, for 
instance, either in a situation in which one individual recognises that face with a high degree 
of confidence but is not able to consciously remember where and when this person was met 
(recognition-by-knowing), or in a situation in which one individual feels that this face is 
intriguingly familiar but with a poorer degree of confidence about this feeling (recognition-
by-feeling). So, Know responses may include memory experiences that vary not only in their 
content but also in their cognitive and neural bases (Kihlstrom). To assess these, subjective 
self-paced reports of Remembering and Knowing should be complemented with verbal 
justifications (Bodner & Lindsay 2003), electrophysiological measures such as event-related 
potentials (ERPs) (Woodruff et al. 2006), or cardiovascular measures (Fiacconi et al. 2016). 
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In the current context, verbal justifications would allow experimenters to verify whether 
participants’ Know responses indeed corresponded to knowing, feeling, or believing 
recognition experiences. Besides, accompanying the subjective self-reports with more 
“objective” memory measures is of particular interest for the study of populations that have a 
decreased ability to precisely assess their subjective memory experience (reflected in Know 
responses, vividness or confidence ratings), such as older adults or patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease (Duarte et al. 2008; El Haj & Antoine 2017; Folville et al. 2019; Wong et al. 2012). 
 
Beyond feelings of familiarity and recollection, the outputs of processing within the 
systems described in the Integrative Memory model may take other forms, such as thinking 
about future events, preference judgments, and so forth. Sreekumar et al.  give the example 
of judgments about the temporal context in which an event took place. For instance, when 
people are asked to judge whether a stimulus was seen in the first or second part of an 
experiment, they can use two kinds of strategies (Friedman 1993). On the one hand, location-
based processes involve the reconstruction of the time of occurrence, based on the contextual 
information encoded with the event (likely to be recovered from the relational representation 
core system). On the other hand, distance-based processes involve evaluation of the time 
elapsed since the event occurred, based on the global strength of the memory. This could be 
indexed by the output of attribution system evaluating the speed and/or the amount of details 
during memory retrieval. 
 
<B>R3.3. Subjective experiences of memory in the pathology 
Kapogiannis & El Haj argue that declines in the components of the subjective experience of 
remembering, such as reliving, mental time travel, or vividness, could account for the 
recollection deficit observed in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). We agree that mental imagery 
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processes may certainly influence how the memory representation is shaped when it is 
consciously brought back to mind. However, we assume that the deterioration of mechanisms 
taking place earlier may account to a greater extent for the impaired recollective abilities 
observed in AD. In our view, impaired recollection abilities is first related to the deterioration 
of item-context bindings in the relational representation core system (Braak’s Stage 3) and 
impaired pattern completion in the hippocampus (Ally et al. 2013; Xue 2018). As the disease 
progresses, pathology extends to posterior regions such as the retrosplenial and posterior 
cingulate cortices, affecting the reinstatement of complex representations and autonoetic 
consciousness of remembered episodes (Genon et al. 2013), and decreasing the ability to have 
the subjective feeling of mentally reliving the past (El Haj  et al. 2016). 
 
At the same time, AD patients have difficulties switching between egocentric and 
allocentric representations during retrieval (Riva et al.; Serino et al. 2015; see also section 
R1.2). Of interest is the finding that taking a first-person perspective and recalling episodic 
details when remembering are both related to the volume of the precuneus (Ahmed et al. 
2018). Moreover, changes in visual perspective during memory retrieval are associated with 
changes in precuneus activity (St Jacques et al. 2017). An atrophy of the precuneus is 
observed in AD (Ryu et al. 2010) and it may arise along with the more global atrophy found 
in posterior brain regions during Braak’s Stages 4 to 6. Together, these findings highlight that 
AD is associated with a decline in recollection abilities that may result first from an 
impairment in the relational representation core system supporting pattern completion, along 
with progressive dysfunctions of posterior regions supporting autonoetic consciousness, 
mental imagery, and visual perspective.  
 




A last question needs to be considered: Is the Integrative Memory model a dual-process 
model of recognition memory? As reminded by Osth et al., whether memory retrieval is best 
explained by the involvement of two processes (i.e., recollection and familiarity), or by a 
single process, has been a matter of debate for the past 20 years at least. Rather than taking 
side in this debate, we would like to emphasize that the critical notion in our framework is 
interaction. The subjective feelings and the explicit judgments provided in a memory task are 
qualitatively different because they rely on the reactivation of qualitatively different 
representations (core systems). In fact, there are not only two possible outputs (recollection 
versus familiarity), but a variety of feelings and judgments that can arise (see sect. R3.2). The 
distinction between outputs and representations is critical, and the nature of the output in a 
given situation will depend on the interaction between reactivated representations and 
inferential operations that rely on metacognitive, monitoring, control, and attention 
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